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HON. R. KENTON MUSGRAVE AND GARLAND
STEPHENS*

The GATT-Tuna Dolphin Dispute:

An Update
ABSTRACT
This articlereviews a CaliforniaFederalDistrictCourt'sorderthat
the United States government must enforce the provisions of the
Marine Mammal Protection Act, resulting in an embargo of tuna
products from Mexico. At the request of Mexico, a GATT panel
found that the Marine Mammal ProtectionAct is in conflict with
the GATT. The panelfound inter alia that restrictionson imports
of tuna based upon fishing methods rather than the physical condition of the product violate the GATT principle of treating imported products no less favorably than domestic products. The
panel alsofound that GATT provisions allowing regulations necessary to protect animal life or health or to conserve natural resources do not allow such measures outside of the enacting
jurisdiction. The panel's findings have not been adopted by the
GATT. The United States has since enacted the InternationalDolphin Conservation Act, which includes provisions incompatible
with the GATT panel's findings. Widespread public support for
dolphin protection makes it appear likely that a United States conflict with GATT trade regulation mechanisms will resultfrom efforts to protect dolphins.
To the dolphinalone naturehas given that which philosophers
seek:friendshipfor no advantage.Though it has no needfor
help of any man, yet it is a genialfriend to all,and has helped
man.-Plutarch
The death of hundreds of thousands of dolphins, resulting from
commercial fishing has created international concern. A brief synopsis
of recent developments in this controversy and its relation to international trade is attempted below.
In the eastern tropical pacific ocean ("ETP"), for reasons that
remain mysterious, dolphins travel in association with schools of yellowfin tuna. Commercial tuna fishers have exploited this association
by using dolphins to locate tuna. Dolphins must come to the surface
to breathe and are thus visible to spotters. By surrounding dolphins
*Judge Musgrave is a federal judge at the U.S. Court of International Trade. Garland
Stephens was a law clerk for Judge R. Kenton Musgrave at the U.S. Court of International
Trade from 1991 to 1993, and for Judge John C. Holstein at the Missouri Supreme Court
in 1991. He is durrently pursuing a graduate degree in electrical engineering.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 33

with purse seine nets1 , tuna fishers have been able to trap tuna swimming below the dolphins. Unfortunately, this method has often been
disastrous for the encircled dolphins, who often are entrapped in the
nets and are drowned or severely injured. The National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") has estimated that this fishing technique, known
as "setting on dolphin," has caused
the death more than six million
2
dolphins over the last 30 years.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA") addresses the
effects of commercial fishing on ocean mammals in general, and the
effects of yellowfin tuna fishing on dolphins in particular. 3 The MMPA
imposes a general moratorium on the taking or importation of marine
mammals or marine mammal products.4 "Taking" is defined 5as harassing,
hunting, capturing, killing or attempting to do the same.
An exception to the moratorium is made for incidental taking
of marine mammals in the course of commercial fishing operations conducted under a permit issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service. 6 Only one permit has been issued, to the American Tunaboat
7 The permit allows up to 20,500 dolphins to be taken anAssociation.
8
nually.
The MMPA recites the "immediate goal" that the incidental marine mammal mortality permitted in the course of commercial fishing
operations be reduced to insignificant levels approaching zero.9 It also
requires a ban on the importation of fish products that have been caught
with commercial fishing technology that results in incidental mortality or serious injury to ocean mammals in excess of United States standards.10 Fish exporting nations must provide reasonable proof of the
fish imported into the
effects of fishing technology used in producing
11
United States in order to avoid the ban.
The Act contains special provisions for purse seine fishing for
yellowfin tuna, allowing that the mortality goal is satisfied when the
domestic fleet utilizes the best marine mammal safety techniques and
1. A purse seine net is a net weighted on one end and buoyed on the other that is
used to encircle a school of fish. Then the bottom of the net is closed by drawing a line
through rings attached to the weighted end, trapping the fish inside.
2. Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals; Listing of Eastern Spinner Dolphin as

Depleted, 57 Fed. Reg. 27,010, 27,014, Table 2 (June 17, 1992).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988).

4. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1988).
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(12).

6. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2).
7. General Agreement On Tariffs And Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report On
United States Restrictions On Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1599 (1991) [hereinafter
GATT Panel Reportl.
8. Listing of Eastern Spinner Dolphin as Depleted, 57 Fed. Reg. at 27,013.
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2).
10. Id.
11. § 1371(a)(2)(A).
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equipment that are economically and technologically practicable. The
incidental taking rate of the domestic tuna fleet then serves as the standard which must be met by producers of tuna 12 exported to the United
States. 13 For the ETP,14 the average rate of incidental taking may not
exceed 1.25 times that of United States vessels during the same period.
The Act also sets species-specific limits, as a percentage of total annual
incidental taking of marine mammals, for the eastern spinner dolphin
(fifteen percent) and coastal spotted dolphin (two percent).' 5
To establish that they meet United States standards for ocean
mammal safety, nations purse seining for yellowfin tuna in the ETP
must also provide documentary evidence that they have adopted a regulatory program governing the incidental taking of marine mammals
in the course of such harvesting that is comparable to that of the United
States.1 6 The regulatory program specifically must include "such prohibitions against encircling pure schools of species of marine mammals,
conducting sundown sets, and other activities as are made applicable
to United States vessels." 17 The rate of incidental taking must be monitored by the observer program of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
or equivalent program in which the United States particiAssociation
18
pates.
To prevent circumvention of the direct embargo, the MMPA also
requires intermediary nations exporting yellowfin tuna to the United
States to certify and provide reasonable proof that they have acted to
prohibit tuna imports from nations whose direct exports of tuna are
banned under the Act. The prohibition must be effective within 60 days
of the United States ban. Otherwise imports of yellowfin tuna products from such intermediary nations are banned under the Act. 19
Six months after a ban on yellowfin tuna is imposed under the
MMPA, the Secretary of the Treasury must notify the President, triggering the Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967, commonly known as the
12. The statutes and regulations referred to in this article frequently refer to "tuna
and tuna products." This article does not distinguish between tuna and tuna products,
and reference to either herein should be understood to include both.
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2).
14. For purposes of regulation, the ETP is defined as the area of the Pacific Ocean
bounded by 40 degrees north latitude, 40 degrees south latitude, 160 degrees west
longitude, and the coasts of North, Central and South America. 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1992).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(C); H.R. Rep. No. 970,100th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1988) reprinted
in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6154, 6171 ("The Committee strongly supports this provision in
"),quoted
order to prevent embargoed nations from circumventing U.S. restrictions ....
in Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 826,833 (N.D. Cal. 1922) [hereinafter
Earth Island Institute I].
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Pelly Amendment. 20 The Pelly Amendment authorizes the President
to institute a discretionary ban on all fish products "for any duration
as the President determines appropriate and to the extent that such
prohibition is sanctioned by the General Agreement on Tariffs and
21
Trade."
A related Title 16 measure, the Dolphin Protection Consumer
Information Act ("'DPCIA"), regulates the labeling of tuna. 22 The DPCIA
23
makes it a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
to label as "Dolphin Safe" any tuna product exported from or offered
for sale in the United States, containing tuna harvested with purse seines
in the ETP, unless certain requirements are met.24 Those requirements
include written statements by the captain of the harvesting vessel certifying that the vessel did not intentionally encircle dolphin while fishing and by the Secretary or a representative of the Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission stating that there was an approved observer
on the vessel while fishing and no intentional encirclement of dolphin
occurred. These statements must be endorsed by each exporter, importer and processor of the product.25 Tuna harvested with26drift nets
on the high seas is also forbidden the "Dolphin Safe" label.
The MMPA was enacted in 1972. Nevertheless, despite high
rates of dolphin mortality among foreign fleets and significant reductions in domestic rates, no action was taken to ban tuna imports under
the MMPA until 1990, when the environmental group Earth Island Institute sued the Secretary of Commerce in Federal District Court.27 The
Court issued an injunction barring the importation of yellowfin tuna
harvested in the eastern tropical pacific from any nation, until the Secretary of Commerce made a finding under the Act that the average rate
of the incidental taking for that nation was within the standards set by
the Act. 28
Although the issue has not apparently been raised in the District Court, the question of jurisdiction is a troubling one. The Court
of International Trade, and not the district court, has exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions brought against the United States or its agencies or officers that arises out of any law providing for "embargoes or
other quantitative restrictions on the importation of merchandise for
20. 22 U.S.C § 1978(a) (1993).

21. Id.
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (Supp. 111990).

23. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1385(d)(1).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1385(d)(2)(B).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1385(d)(1).
27. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990) [hereinafter
Earth Island Institute Ill.
28. Id. at 976.
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reasons other than the protection of the public health or safety." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i)(4)(1988).
The United States Supreme Court has construed § 1581(i)(4) to
mean "a governmentally imposed quantitative restriction-of zero-on
the importation of merchandise." 29 In that case, the Court noted that
an embargo may be imposed on a product or on an individual country.30 Since the ban on tuna importations imposed under the MMPA is
a quantitative restriction of zero on the importation of tuna imposed
by the Secretary of Commerce, and is imposed for reasons other than
the protection of public health or safety, it appears to fall squarely
31
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade.
The district court issued the injunction on August 28, 1990. On
September 7,1990, the NMFS made the findings required to lift the ban
on Mexican tuna. 32 These findings were made despite the fact that Mexico had exceeded the limits on eastern spinner dolphin mortality for
1989. The findings were based on a NMFS regulation allowing the
agency to "reconsider" data for a nation that had exceeded the limits
compliance based on the first six months
for a given year, and 3certify
3
year.
following
of the
Earth Island Institute sought a temporary restraining order
("TRO") banning importation of tuna from Mexico. The district court
granted the TRO, holding that the regulation conflicted with the plain
language of the statute. The court held that the finding of comparability for species-specific mortality must be based on the data for the entire year of 1989, and the ban must remain in34place until data for the
entire year of 1990 demonstrated compliance.
The TRO was subsequently converted into a preliminary injunction, and was upheld on appeal. 35 The court of appeals rejected
the government's arguments that the reconsideration regulation created a more effective incentive to reduce dolphin mortality rates,
"[b]ecause the reconsideration regulation creates such a potential for
abuse, and has in fact already been used to circumvent the intent of
Congress."36
After the district court ruling was affirmed, the NMFS began
to apply the intermediary embargo provisions of the MMPA. The in29. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 185 (1988).
30. Id. at 184.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3).
32. Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, Notice of findings of conformance,
55 Fed. Reg. 37,730 (Sept. 13, 1990) (effective Sept. 7, 1990).
33. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449,1451 (9th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter
Earth Island Institute 1111; 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(e)(5)(iv).
34. Earth Island Institute HII,929 F.2d at 1452.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1453.
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termediary embargo was first applied to yellowfin tuna from nations
believed to have imported yellowfin tuna from Mexico. Such imports
were prohibited unless accompanied by a statement declaring that the
merchandise was not harvested with purse seines in the ETP by Mexican vessels. Five nations were affected. 37 The Earth Island Institute
challenged the NMFS interpretation of the intermediary embargo provisions. The district court held that the NMFS enforcement of the intermediary embargo was inconsistent with the MMPA. To comply with
the statute, the court held, the government of any nation importing
yellowfin tuna and exporting yellowfin tuna to the United States would
have to certify and provide proof that it has acted to prohibit importation of tuna that was barred from direct importation into the United
States.38 Imports of all yellowfin tuna from nations that failed to comply with the statute were prohibited, whether harvested by Mexico in
the ETP or otherwise, the court held. 39 The court's order resulted in an
40
expansion of the intermediary embargo to fifteen additional nations.
Shortly after the district court entered its initial order prohibiting imports from Mexico, Mexico filed a protest under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), alleging that the embargo
under the MMPA and the labeling provisions of the DPCIA violated
41
GATT rules. The GATT Council agreed to set up an investigative panel.
Before the GATT panel, Mexico argued that the MMPA and regulations prohibiting yellowfin tuna imports from Mexico were quantitative restrictions on importation that violated GATT Article XI. Article
XI:1 forbids prohibitions or restrictions on imports other than duties,
taxes or other charges.
The United States responded that the measures were internal
regulations enforced at the time or point of importation under Article
III:4 and Note Ad Article IIl. Article III:4 requires parties to the GATT
to treat the products of other GATT signatories no less favorably than
domestic products under all laws, regulations and requirements affecting
37. The five nations initially subject to the intermediary embargo on yellowfin tuna
from Mexico were Costa Rica, France, Italy, Japan and Panama. Taking and Importing
of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations, Correction, 56 Fed.
Reg. 37,606 (Aug. 7, 1991); Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals Incidental to
Commercial Fishing Operations, Notice to Importers, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,995 (June 12,1991).
38. The definition of "intermediary nation" was changed by the International Dolphin
Conservation Act, to mean a nation that exports yellowfin tuna to the United States and
imports yellowfin tuna that is subject to the direct ban under the MMPA. 16 U.S.C. §
1362(17) (1993).
39. Earth Island Institute 1, 785 F. Supp. at 833.
40. The fifteen additional nations were: Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia,
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Netherlands Antilles, Singapore, Spain,
Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, United Kingdom, Venezuela. Taking and Importing
of Marine Mammals; Import Requirements, Interim Final Rule With Request For Comments,
57 Fed. Reg. 41,701 (Sept. 11, 1992).
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their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. Note Ad Article III states that laws or regulations that
apply both to imported and like domestic products and are enforced
against the imported product on importation are nevertheless internal
regulations under Article III.
The panel's analysis focused on the distinction between the regulation of tuna as a product and the regulation of the process used to harby
vest tuna. The panel found that the fishing techniques prescribed
42
the MMPA could not have an effect on tuna as a product.
The panel noted that the word product is used throughout paragraph I and 4 of Article III. 43 "This suggests that Article III covers only
measures affecting products as such," the panel reasoned. Similarly,
the repeated use of the word "product" in Note Ad Article II144 "suggests that the Note covers only measures applied to imported products
that are of the same nature as those applied to the domestic products."
the importaThe panel offered the example of a measure prohibiting
45
tion of products whose sale is forbidden domestically.
The panel reasoned further that the provisions of Article III:4
applicable to regulations should be interpreted in light of the contracting parties' interpretations of Article 111:2 respecting internal taxes.
Article 111:2 forbids a party to the GATT from taxing products of any

41. Dispute Panel Established To Investigate Mexican Complaint On U.S. Tuna Import
Limits, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 246 (1991).
42. GATT Panel Report, para. 5.10, 30 I.L.M. at 1617.
43. GATT, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 12-13 (S. Zamora & R. Brand eds., 1990); art. Ill, para. I
provides,
The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products,
and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or
use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied
to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production.
Id. at 13; art. III, para. 4 provides,
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect
of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
44. Id. at 63; Note Ad art. III provides,
Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or requirement
of the kind referred to in paragraph I which applies to an imported product
and to the like domestic product and is collected or enforced in the case of
the imported product at the time or point of importation, is nevertheless
to be regarded as an internal tax or other internal charge, or a law, regulation
or requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1, and is accordingly
subject to the provisions of Article Ill.
45. GATT Panel Report, para. 5.11, 30 I.L.M. at 1617.
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other party more than like domestic products. 46 The panel noted that
the Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments, adopted by the
contracting parties in 1970, had distinguished between taxes levied directly on products, and those such as social security charges and payproducts. Only direct taxes
roll taxes, that were not levied directly on
47
adjustment.
tax
border
for
eligible
were
The panel concluded it would be inconsistent to restrict the application of Note Ad Article III to taxes borne by products, while per48
mitting its application to regulations not applied to the product as such.
The MMPA regulations governing domestic harvesting of tuna "could
not be regarded as being applied to tuna products as such because they
would not directly regulate the sale of tuna and could not possibly affect tuna as a product." Therefore, the panel reasoned, the import proprohibition are not
hibition and the provisions of the MMPA for the
49
III.
Article
Ad
Note
under
regulations
internal
The panel found that Article 111:4 requires the United States to
treat tuna no less favorably than domestic tuna whether or not the incidental taking of dolphins by Mexican vessels corresponds to that of
United States vessels. Even if the enforcement provisions (such as the
provision for seizure of cargoes) of the MMPA were considered to regulate tuna as a product, regulation of the incidental taking of dolphins
cannot possibly affect tuna as a product. Article 111:4 requires a comparison of the treatment of imported tuna as a product with the treatment of domestic tuna as a product. Therefore, the panel concluded,
the import prohibition did not meet the requirements of Article 111.50
After rejecting the United States' arguments respecting Article
III, the panel noted that the United States had not presented any legal
arguments to support the conclusion that the MMPA import prohibition was consistent with Article XI:1, which generally forbids quantitative restrictions on imports. The panel therefore found, without
elaboration, that it was not consistent. 51 In view of this finding, the
panel declined to consider Mexico's52argument that the prohibition was
also inconsistent with Article XIII.
46. Supra note 43, at 13, art. Ill, para. 2 provides,
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess
of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover,
no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal
charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the
principles set forth in paragraph 1.
47. GATT Panel Report, para. 5.13,30 I.L.M. at 1618 (quoting BISD 18S/97, 100-101,
para. 14).
48. Id.
49. Id., para. 5.14.
50. Id., para. 5.15.

51. Id., para. 5.18.
52. Id., para. 5.19.
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The panel then considered the Pelly Amendment. The panel
noted that although the amendment authorized an embargo, no embargo under the amendment was in effect. Relying on a prior GATT
panel report regarding Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the present
panel found that since the embargo under the amendment was discretionary, not mandatory, the amendment was not inconsistent with the
GATT.5 3
The panel next examined the United States' position that the
MMPA provisions were justified under Article XX(b) and Article XX(g).
Article XX provides,
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption
The United States argued that the tuna ban and the MMPA were
justified under Article XX(b) because they served the sole purpose of
protecting dolphin life and health, and were necessary to protect the
life and health of dolphins outside of the United States' jurisdiction because there was no reasonable alternative method to achieve that end.
Mexico argued that Article XX(b) did not apply to measures intended
to protect the life or health of animals outside of the jurisdiction of the
contracting party imposing them. Moreover, the tuna ban was not necof international coessary because the satisfactory alternative method
4
operation was available to the United States.5
The panel found that the language of Article XX(b) does not
answer the question of whether it is intended to encompass measures
designed to protect life and health outside of the enacting party's ju55
risdiction.
The panel then turned to the drafting history of Article XX(b).
The panel examined the New York Draft of the ill-fated International
Trade Organization 5 6 charter. The GATT had been intended a tempo53. Id. at 1619, para. 5.21.
54. Id., para. 5.24.
55. Id. at 1619-20, para. 5.25.
56. The ITO charter was never ratified by the United States. The GATT has been the
focus of multilateral trade relations ever since. See R. Hudec, The GATT Legal System
and World Trade Diplomacy (2d ed. 1990).
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rary trade agreement that would be absorbed into the ITO when the
GATT therefore
ITO came into force. The substantive provisions of 5the
7
derive directly from provisions of the ITO charter.
The New York Draft revised the preamble of Article XX to read
as it does at present, but Article XX(b) of the draft stated,
"For the purpose of protecting human, animal or plant life or health,
if corresponding domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist
in the importing country." The panel found that the proviso reflected
concerns regarding the abuse of sanitary regulations by importing
countries and was later dropped as unnecessary. The panel concluded
that the drafters of Article XX(b) were concerned with5 8sanitary measures within the jurisdiction of the importing country.
More fundamentally, the panel concluded that the United States'
interpretation of Article XX(b) is intrinsically incompatible with GATT
multilateralism:
The panel considered that if the broad interpretation of Article XX(b) suggested by the United States were accepted,
each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life
or health protection policies from which other contracting
parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights
under the General Agreement. The General Agreement would
then no longer constitute a multilateral framework for trade
among all contracting parties but would provide legal seof
curity only in respect of trade between a limited number
59
contracting parties with identical internal regulations.
The panel further found that regardless of the jurisdictional arguments, the United States had not demonstrated that it had exhausted
all reasonably available options consistent with the GATT, including
specifically, negotiation of international cooperative agreements. The
panel went on to conclude that in any event, the method of regulation
chosen by the United States could not be necessary to the life and
health of dolphins. Because the maximum rate of incidental taking for
a foreign fleet in a given period was linked to the actual rate for the
United States fleet for the same period, the limitation was too unpre6°
dictable to be necessary.
The panel next considered the United States' argument that the
MMPA measures are justified under Article XX(g) because they are primarily aimed at conserving dolphin, and that the tuna import restrictions are "primarily aimed at rendering effective restrictions on domestic
production or consumption" of dolphin. As it had with respect to Ar57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 50, 51.
GATT Panel Report, para. 5.26,30 I.L.M. at 1620.
Id., para. 5.27.
Id., para. 5.28.
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ticle XX(b), Mexico61argued that Article XX(g) could not be applied extrajurisdictionally.
The panel looked to the language of Article XX(g) that allows
measures taken "in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption," and noted that a previous panel had found that
a measure could only be considered taken "in conjunction with" production restrictions if it was primarily aimed at rendering those restrictions effective. Reasoning that a country can only effectively control
production or consumption under its jurisdiction, the panel found that
"This suggests that Article XX(g) was intended to permit contracting
parties to take trade measures primarily aimed at rendering effective
62
restrictions on production or consumption within their jurisdiction."
The panel reasoned that Article XX(g) allows contracting parties to set their own conservation policies, provided the measures taken
relate to conservation of exhaustible natural resources, and do not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade. The panel noted that these conditions refer to the
trade measures taken and not to the conservation policies of contracting parties. The panel characterized the United States interpretation of
Article XX(g) as "extrajurisdictional" and concluded that if accepted,
each contracting party could unilaterally determine the conservation policies from which other contracting parties could
not deviate without jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement.
The panel therefore rejected the United States interpretation, citing
"[tihe [same] considerations" that led to the rejection of the extrajurisdictional application of Article XX(b). 63
The panel also concluded that the MMPA did not pass muster
under Article XX(g) because it was not primarily aimed at the conservation of dolphins. The panel reached this conclusion for the same reasons it found that the MMPA measures were not necessary to protect
the life and health of dolphins under Article XX(b), that is, because the
limitation on taking by Mexico was based on the unpredictable64 numbers of dolphin taken by the United States fleet for the period.
The panel next examined the intermediary embargo provisions
of the MMPA. For the same reasons noted for the direct import prohibition provisions, the panel found that the intermediary embargo provisions did not fall within Article III or Note Ad Article 111, and were
inconsistent with Article XI, Article XX(b), and Article XX(g). Since the
direct prohibitions were not consistent with the GATT, the intermedi61. Id., para. 5.30.
62. Id. at 1620-21, para. 531.

63. Id. at 1621, para. 5.32.
64. Id., para. 5.33.
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ary provisions were found not to be necessary to secure compliance
with provisions
that were consistent with the GATT under Article
65
XX(d).

Mexico also challenged the DPCIA, arguing that its labeling
provisions were subject to the most favored nation marking requirements of Article IX:I. The United States argued that the most favored
nation and national treatment provisions of Article 1:1 and Article 111:4
applied instead. The panel found that Article IX is concerned with the
marking of origin, and not with marking of products generally, and
thus rejected Mexico's argument. 66
The panel further reasoned that the DPCIA restricts only labeling and not the sale of tuna products; tuna may be sold with or
without the "Dolphin Safe" label. The panel found that any benefit
from use of this label depends on the free exercise of consumer preference for the "Dolphin Safe" label. No benefits flow from the government due to its use. The panel concluded that the only issue was
whether the DPCIA provisions governing use of the label met the requirements of Article 1:1.67
The panel considered that the DPCIA is based in part on the
finding that encircling dolphins while purse seining for tuna in the
ETP is a frequent cause of dolphin mortality, and allows the use of the
"Dolphin Safe" label for tuna harvested in the ETP only upon proof
that such methods were not used. The panel noted that the information before it indicated that the ETP was the only place where encircling dolphin intentionally while tuna fishing was practiced, and
concluded that the labeling requirements therefore did not discriminate against countries fishing in that area. Since the labeling requirements applied to all nations fishing in the ETP, the panel found the
regulations did not discriminate between products originating in Mexico and those originating elsewhere.68 The panel concluded that the labeling provisions of the DPCIA were not inconsistent with Article 1:1.69
Based on its findings, the panel recommended that the GATT
membership request that the United States bring the tuna import restriction measures into conformity with its obligations under the GATT.70
The GATT ruling was soon criticized by environmental groups
as a danger to the environment, and added fuel to the already heated
debate about the environmental effects of other trade agreements, including the North American Free Trade Agreement. 71 The author of
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 1621-22, paras. 5.35-5.40.
Id. at 1622, para. 5.41.
Id., para. 5.42.
Id., para. 5.43.

69. Id., para. 5.44.
70. Id. at 1623, para. 7.1(c).
71. See EnvironmentalGroup Says GATT Tuna Report CouldHave Disastrous Conservation
Impact, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1325 (1991).
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the DPCIA, then Representative Barbara Boxer of California stated,
"Mexico's challenge of [a] United States environmental law that protects dolphins doesn't speak well for its claim to be a full partner in
the protection of the environment under the United States-Mexico trade
agreement." Sixty-two other members of Congress joined Representative Boxer in a letter to the President and the United States Trade Representative indicating that they would not support any attempt to repeal
the laws found inconsistent with the GATT by the panel.12
At a meeting of the United States-Mexico Binational Commission held shortly after the GATT panel findings were announced, Mexico agreed not to pursue its complaint with the GATT.73 The United
States Trade Representative has since issued a notice stating, "The Governments of the United States and Mexico have worked together since
the issuance of the panel report to resolve their dispute without further proceedings in the GATT." 74 To date, the GATT Council has not
adopted the report. However, the European Community has filed a new
complaint with the GATT, and a dispute settlement panel has been established. 75
The Bush administration subsequently submitted a legislative
proposal to Congress "aimed at promoting international dolphin protection and resolving the GATT issue," by lifting the MMPA tuna ban
against any country that agreed to a five year moratorium on setting
on dolphin. 76 The proposal was endorsed by the governments of
Venezuela and Mexico.7 This proposed legislation, with amendments,
was eventually passed by Congress and signed into law as the International Dolphin Conservation Act ("IDCA") of 1992.78
The IDCA amends the MMPA by adding Title III, entitled "Global
Moratorium To Prohibit Certain Tuna Harvesting Practices." Title III
authorizes the Secretary of State to enter into international agreements
establishing a five year or longer global moratorium beginning March
1,1994, on harvesting tuna b encircling dolphins or other marine mammals with purse seine nets.4 Any agreement must include an inter72. Members Of Congress Protest Recent GATT Ruling On U.S. Embargo Of Mexican Tuna,
8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1399 (1991).
73. Mexico Agrees To Defer Action On Complaint On U.S. Tuna Embargo, 8 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1351 (1991).
74. Establishment of Dispute Settlement Panel Concerning U.S. Import Restrictions
on Certain Tuna, 57 Fed. Reg 38,549 (Aug. 25, 1992).
75. Id.
76. H.R. Rep. No. 746, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 14 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2919,2924. See also 138 Cong. Rec. E2774 (daily ed. Sept. 23,1992) (statement
of Rep. William J.Hughes (D-NJ)) (The proposal "resolves the GATT problem by removing
the comparability standards and immediately lifting the embargo ....
77. H.R. Rep. No. 746, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 15.
78. The International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-523, 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 3425 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1411).
79. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a) (West 1993).
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national research program authorized to harvest tuna despite the moratorium, require each party to the agreement to take all necessary and
appropriate steps to comply with the moratorium, and encourage each
party to seek through negotiations to encourage other tuna fishing nations to become parties to the agreement. 8°
Any country that formally communicates a commitment to implement the moratorium to the Secretary of State is not subject to a ban
on yellowfin tuna products under § 101(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the MMPA.
The commitment must include a requirement that all purse seining vessels larger than 400 tons fishing for yellowfin tuna in the ETP carry an
observer, and at least half of all such observers must be supervised by
a "competent regional organization." 81 In the interim before the moratorium begins, the nation must commit to reduce dolphin mortality
significantly each successive year.82 The Secretary of Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is required to periodically determine whether countries that have committed to the moratorium are
fully implementing the requirements of the moratorium. 83 If the Secretary of State finds that a country is not meeting its commitment, the
of
Secretary must notify the President and Congress, and ban imports
84
all yellowfin tuna products from that country 15 days later.
If a country whose tuna exports have been banned for failure
to comply with the moratorium agreement does not certify and provide proof within sixty days of the tuna ban that it has fully implemented the moratorium, the IDCA requires the President to ban the
imports of fish products other than yellowfin tuna totaling forty percent of fish imports from that country.85 The categories of fish prod86
ucts to be banned are those that the President "considers appropriate."
This ban and the ban on yellowfin tuna products remain in effect until
the Secretary determines that the country is implementing the agree87
ment.
The IDCA also restricts the general permit previously granted
the American Tunaboat Association under the MMPA. It limits total
dolphin mortality, including those caused by research, to no more than
1,000 during 1992, and no more than 800 from January 1, 1993 to the
beginning of the moratorium on March 1, 1994. It also prohibits set80. 16 U.S.C.A. §1412(b).
81. "Competent regional organization" is defined as the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission for the tuna fishery in the ETP. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1362(16) (West 1993).
82. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1415(a) (West 1993).

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

16 U.S.C.A.
16 U.S.C.A.
16 U.S.C.A.
Id.
16 U.S.C.A.

§ 1415(b).
§ 1415(b)(1).
§ 1415(b)(2).
§ 1416(b)(3).
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ting purse seines on any school of dolphins which are observed to contain eastern spinner or coastal spotted dolphin before the net is deployed. Unless no major purse seine tuna fishing country8 8 agrees to
the moratorium, the general permit expires on the date the moratorium
89
begins.
If no major purse seine tuna fishing country agrees to the moratorium, the IDCA restricts dolphin mortalities under the general permit for each year after 1992, including those caused by research, to
numbers not to exceed the mortalities that occurred under the permit
the previous year. Dolphin mortality must be reduced "by statistically
significant amounts each year to levels approaching zero by December
31, 1999," when the permit expires. The Secretary is granted discretion
90
to impose any additional restrictions deemed appropriate.
The IDCA elevates the "Dolphin Safe" criteria of the DPCIA
from a labeling restriction to a standard required for sale. After June 1,
1994, it is unlawful under the IDCA for any person to sell, purchase,
offer for sale, transport or ship in the United States, any tuna or tuna
product that is not dolphin safe. For tuna harvested in the ETP, "dolphin safe" is defined under the previous DPCIA provisions. 9 1 For tuna
harvested elsewhere, to be "dolphin safe" tuna product must not contain tuna harvested with drift nets on the high seas, and must be accompanied by written statement by the captain of the vessel certifying
that no dolphins were intentionally encircled during the voyage. Should
the Secretary determine that tuna is harvested in a fishery besides the
ETP by setting on marine mammals, tuna from that fishery must be accompanied by statements from both the captain of the vessel and an
92
observer.
It is evident that the IDCA does not bring United States legislation on the dolphin/tuna issue into conformity with the GATT. It does
not remove the import prohibitions found inconsistent with the GATT
by the panel. Nor does the "dolphin safe" standard for tuna imports
comply with the panel's interpretation of Article III, since as the panel
found, setting on dolphin does not affect the tuna as a product.
It is nevertheless possible that the IDCA will "resolve the GATT
issue," if all of the aggrieved parties agree to the moratorium. As it is,
Mexico, Venezuela and Ecuador have committed to prohibiting setting
88. "Major purse seine tuna fishing country" is defined as a country which on the
effective date of the IDCA has an active purse seine tuna fishing fleet of 20 or more
vessels. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1416(c).
89. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1416(a).
90. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1416(a)(4).
91. That is, it may not contain tuna harvested by setting on dolphin or marine
mammals, or harvested on the high seas with drift nets. See supra note 24 and accompanying
text.

92. 16 U.S.C.A. 1417(d).
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on dolphin. 93 The EC, despite lodging a complaint with the GATT (bealso taken steps to prohibit the use of
fore passage of the IDCA), has
94
purse seines in tuna fishing.
More diplomatic and political maneuvering will likely be necessary to settle the legal questions, however. The EC complaint before
the GATT was heard in March, 1993, and a ruling is expected in July,
1993. 95 The United States apparently reiterated many of the arguments
made to the panel requested by Mexico. 96 If the panel decision is consistent with the Mexico-United States panel, the panel will likely rule
against the United States. Since the pending Uruguay round of GATT
negotiations cannot provide the same diplomatic leverage against the
EC that the pending North American Free Trade Agreement has given
the United States with Mexico, the United States may not be able to
avoid adoption of an adverse panel report by the GATT membership.
A staff member of the House of Representatives' Natural Resource Committee has described changing the MMPA trade provisions as "a night97
mare."
Ultimately, the reduction of dolphin-destructive fishing may
be accomplished through consumer preference:
[S]ince April, 1990, the three major processors for the American market have refused to purchase tuna for canning that
is not 'dolphin-safe'. European governments and processors
seem poised to follow their lead. These actions,. not any dictate of Congress, has [sic] caused the reduction in the size of
the United States fleet operating in the ETP and created serious problems for the foreign boats that still fish tuna in as98
sociation with dolphins.
If repeal or amendment of the MMPA would not remove the economic
disincentive, then little is gained by GATT protests. But the public sentiment expressed in the supermarkets is also heard in Washington. Like
the tuna industry actions, Congressional responses to tuna fishing practices and to the GATT panel report have been largely driven by public environmental concerns. 99 The GATT panel report has even been
93. H.R. Rep. No. 746, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 14, reprintedin 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.

2919, 2924 (July 28, 1992).
94.

EC Commission Delays Action On EC Tuna Embargo Proposal, 9 Int'l Trade Rep.

(BNA) 1259 (1992).
95. U.S. Says Secondary Ban Is Covered By GATT Exception Rules, Inside U.S. Trade,

Apr. 16, 1993, at 1.
96. Id.
97. Policy On Environment, Trade Nexus Expected From Administration In June, 10 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 756 (1993) (quoting staff member Karen Steuer).
98. 138 Cong. Rec. S17,841 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992).
99. See, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. H9064, 9067 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Gerry E. Studds (D-MA)):
No other single wildlife issue has caused more public outrage than this one.
Hundreds of letters, telephone calls, and petitions with thousands of
signatures begging Congress to put a stop to this practice pour into the
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referred to as "The catalyst for the environmentalist onslaught" against
the GATT and free trade. 100 Public pressure has been felt in the EC as
well. The EC commissioner responsible for fishing issues stated that he
had received a record number of letters on the dolphin/ tuna issue. "You
cannot ignore public opinion," he said. 101
The counterpoint of the GATT report with Congressional actions illustrates the inevitable tension between democratic sovereignty
and any system of multilateral trade deregulation. The reluctance, on
the one hand, to surrender the responsiveness to the electorate that
characterizes democracy and the need, on the other, for a single authoritative voice with the power to commit the nation to a particular
course of legislative action, has been the principal impediment to the
development of a comprehensive international trade regime. Indeed,
the reluctance to compromise sovereignty was a major factor in the failure of the ITO charter in 1950.
It is not unreasonable to presume that the delay by the Department
of Commerce in implementing the tuna ban required by the MMPA was
motivated at least in part by foreign policy considerations, including
the threat of a GATT protest. However, as this dispute has so vividly
demonstrated, the GATT binds neither the Congress nor the Courts,
nor a fortiori, the Executive.
This is true even if the GATT Council had adopted the panel
report. The result of adoption would have been a recommendation by
the GATT Council to the United States that it change its laws. Such a
recommendation has no domestic legal effect. 10 2 Although one might
expect that such a recommendation might have a persuasive effect on
Congress, the passage of the IDCA while the decision to adopt the panel
report was pending, and after the formation of a second panel to take
up the EC complaint on the same issue, indicates otherwise. The simple truth is that the Congress is more responsive to the immediate concerns of its constituents than to the relatively tenuous obligations of
the GATT. Democracy has thus worked to the dolphins' advantage.
The conflict of democratic sovereignty with multilateral foreign
obligations has been resolved in other domains in a straightforward
manner: by making the domain less democratic. In monetary relations,
office of my Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation each year.
They come from virtually every State in the Nation-from school children,
retired steelworkers, and consumers who demand dolphin-safe tuna in the
marketplace.
100. The Greening of Protectionism,The Economist, Feb. 27, 1993, at 25.
101. EC Commission Delays Action On EC Tuna Embargo Proposal, 9 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1259 (1992) (statement of Manuel Marin).
102. See, e.g., Suramerica De Aleaciones Laminadas v. United States, 966 F.2d 660,
668 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("The GATT does not trump domestic legislation; if the statutory
provisions at issue here are inconsistent with the GATT, it is a matter for Congress and
not this court to decide and remedy.")
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for example, domestic monetary policy has been delegated to the Federal Reserve, which is largely free to set policy independent of public
opinion. Multilaterally, the International Monetary Fund, unlike the
GATT, also has substantial power to take action affecting a member
nation whether or not that nation acquiesces to the action. The investiture of such power in a supranational organization is perhaps
made more palatable because the likelihood of such IMF action is lowered by the existence of an independent central bank.
The national willingness to delegate monetary power to a democratically unresponsive institution may be due in part to the fact
that monetary policy affects the economy as a whole, and thus does
not lead to the formation of narrow interest groups resisting or advocating a particular policy. Unlike the monolithic institutions and effects of monetary policy, trade is by nature heterogeneous. 0 3 Regulations
affecting only a very narrow segment of a single industry, like yellowfin
tuna, can have repercussions that incite action by the public in ways
that cannot be ignored by the popular branch of government.
The current round of GATT negotiations includes proposals to
create a Multilateral Trade Organization ("MTO") and to strengthen
the dispute resolution process. There have also been proposals to create a permanent group within the MTO to deal with trade and the environment. 1°4 Such a group would no doubt be well adapted to consider
questions of the scientific justification for and economic burden of particular national environmental policies. However, there is an additional
dimension to environmental problems which is not so clearly properly
delegated to an international tribunal:
How much expense is justified in order to avoid a particular form of environmental damage or a particular health effect, or the risk of such effects? This cannot be answered in
the abstract, nor can it be answered by scientists alone; it is
a societal question, one that normally would be resolved at
10 5
least in rough measure by a political process.
Different nations may well arrive at different answers to this
societal question, deciding for example that the lives of dolphins are
not worth the cost of saving them. Arriving at an answer to this question in the United States required the involvement of all three of the
constitutional branches of national government. There is no reason to
103. One need only look at the thousands of tariff classifications of the Harmonized
Tariff Schedules of the United States to realize vast diversity of items in international
commerce. Numerous as they are, the HTSUS inevitably fall short of accurately describing
all of the merchandise traded.
104. EC Proposes Environment-Trade Group In MTO To Be Created In Uruguay Round,
Inside U.S. Trade, Oct. 2, 1992, at 22.
105. Office of Technology Assessment, Trade and Environment: Conflicts and
Opportunities, OTA-BP-ITE-94 (1992).
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believe that other international environmental problems will be any
simpler. Achieving international consensus on such questions will be
orders of magnitude more difficult than the already complex problems
of achieving national consensus. But the future of humans, as well as
dolphins, depends on it.

